"The Secret Life of Fiction" by Lisa Zunshine
A TROUBLING FEATURE OF THE COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INI-
TIATIVE (CCSSI) FOR EN GLISH LANGUAGE ARTS (ELA) IS ITS FAILURE TO  
recognize literature as a catalyst of complex thinking in students. 
According to the CCSSI, to “prepare all students for success in col-
lege, career, and life,” children must read texts “more complex” than 
“stories and literature” (“En glish Language Arts Standards”). The 
assumption that “stories” are inferior to nonfiction has a long tradi-
tion in Western culture; tapping into that prejudice is easy, and no 
proof seems to be required.
Yet the burden of proof is on people who make this assump-
tion or, worse yet, use it as the basis for an educational policy that 
will affect several generations of schoolchildren. Consider the num-
bers provided by CCSSI. If in fourth grade the distribution of “liter-
ary” and “informational” reading in ELA is 50- 50, by eighth grade 
that distribution is expected to be 45- 55 and by twelfth grade 30- 70 
(Common Core State Standards). The justification for this shift is that 
informational texts enrich children’s vocabulary, and a rich vocab-
ulary predicts academic success. One expects that the people who 
prescribe these percentages would have at least some familiarity with 
studies on children’s acquisition of vocabulary, studies that would 
show that informational texts are indeed a better lexicon builder 
than “stories and literature.”
The reason that such studies are never mentioned by the archi-
tects of the CCSSI is that they don’t exist. What does exist is a large 
body of research in developmental psychology that correlates chil-
dren’s vocabulary with the development of their “theory of mind,” 
also known as “mind reading”—that is, their ability to explain their 
own and other people’s behavior as caused by mental states, such as 
thoughts, desires, and feelings.1 Even a cursory look at the studies in 
developmental psychology calls into question facile assertions about 
the benefits of increased exposure to informational texts. A sus-
tained engagement with these studies suggests that reading fiction 
constitutes a direct path to a rich vocabulary, because of demands 
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that fiction places on readers’ theory of mind, 
and hence that the CCSSI recommendation 
should be reading more literature, not less.
Note that what I call sustained engage-
ment calls for more than just reporting the 
findings of cognitive scientists. Although 
some of them suggest that reading fiction 
benefits children’s theory of mind, their spec-
ulations about what makes fiction unique in 
this respect remain rather general. We can’t 
expect it to be otherwise. Most cognitive sci-
entists have neither expertise nor institutional 
incentive for studying literary texts. Literary 
scholars have both, which is why it’s up to 
us to theorize a link between the research in 
cognitive science and recommendations con-
cerning reading practices in the classroom. 
Doing so does not entail drawing up read-
ing lists (indeed, the CCSSI doesn’t offer such 
lists either), but it does entail recognizing 
moments when data from another discipline 
starts amassing on the borders of “our” ter-
ritory—that is, the territory that we are both 
qualified for and invested in exploring.
First, a brief history of research that con-
nects the acquisition of vocabulary to the 
development of theory of mind through (cru-
cially) social class. Studies of vocabulary size 
in children date to 1891, but methodological 
shortcomings rendered them unreliable un-
til the early 1980s. In 1982, Michael Graves 
and his colleagues reported that “at the end 
of first grade, middle- class students [read 
and understood] about 50% more words than 
[did] disadvantaged students” (Graves, Bru-
netti, and Slater 102). The follow- up studies 
demonstrated that although the gap nar-
rows as the students grow older, by the end of 
high school students from socioeconomically 
disadvantaged backgrounds still know one- 
quarter fewer words than their coevals from 
more privileged backgrounds (White, Graves, 
and Slater).
The 1990s saw numerous studies of 
theory- of- mind development in preschool 
children. It’s been shown that children “from 
middle- class families did significantly bet-
ter than children from working- class fami-
lies in all the domains” under assessment, 
including understanding of false belief (i.e., 
understanding that another person may be-
lieve that something you consider false is 
true) and emotion (Cutting and Dunn 861). 
Note the purposely narrow definition of the-
ory of mind used in these studies. Given the 
infamous history of “deficit” approaches to 
testing in underprivileged populations, one 
should be aware of the danger of extrapolat-
ing from this limited operational definition 
any across- the- board assumptions about the 
subjects’ theory of mind.2
Subsequent work on the correlation be-
tween theory of mind and vocabulary added 
an important nuance to the socioeconomic 
factor. Parents from higher socioeconomic 
groups have been shown to engage in more 
discussions of mental states with their chil-
dren. Intervention programs that encouraged 
children from disadvantaged backgrounds 
to construct narratives about their own and 
other people’s mental states were successful 
when they involved parents but not when 
they targeted only classroom communication 
(Peterson, Jesso, and McCabe). Parents “who 
talk about psychological themes promote 
their children’s mental state understanding” 
(Harris, de Rosnay, and Pons 71).3
Intertwined as vocabulary and theory 
of mind appear to be, there is no consensus 
among cognitive scientists about the f low 
of causality. This state of affairs reflects the 
larger issue of the relation of language ac-
quisition and theory-of-mind development. 
Both language and theory of mind are broad 
terms embroiled in controversies, and the 
question “What comes first?” remains open. 
While some scientists ascribe a “fundamen-
tal, causal role to language in the develop-
ment of theory of mind,” others “see the role 
of language as no more than a natural way of 
providing children with the information they 
require for constructing a theory of mind” 


















(Astington and Baird 4). We must be aware of 
that uncertainty—it won’t be resolved soon. 
In fact, one can see this lack of consensus 
as an opening for scholars from other disci-
plines, including our own.
Following up on the studies of the role 
of story listening in the growth of vocabu-
lary in kindergarteners (e.g., Robbins and 
Ehri), Joan Peskin and Janet Wilde Astington 
looked into the possibility that exposure to 
explicit metacognitive terms in stories, such 
as think, believe, and guess, promotes theory- 
of- mind development in children. Metacog-
nitive vocabulary is of particular interest to 
developmental psychologists because, among 
other things, it is correlated with doing well 
academically, except that in middle and high 
school, this vocabulary is represented by such 
words as “infer, imply, predict, doubt, estimate, 
concede, assume, and confirm—terms used in 
scientific and historical thinking” (254).
Peskin and Astington rewrote kinder-
gartners’ picture books, such as Pat Hutchins’s 
Rosie’s Walk, “so that the texts were rich in 
explicit metacognitive vocabulary, such as 
think, know, remember, wonder, figure out, 
and guess” (255). After comparing the perfor-
mance of children reading those books with a 
control group who received the same picture 
books but with no metacognitive vocabulary, 
they found that “hearing numerous metacog-
nitive terms in stories is less important than 
having to actively construct one’s own men-
talistic interpretations from illustrations and 
text that implicitly draw attention to mental 
states” (253). Children introduced to explicit 
metacognitive terms did start using them 
more, but they used them incorrectly (267).
On one hand, this study supports find-
ings of psychologists who argue that what 
parents say in their interactions with their 
children is less important than how they say 
it. As Paul Harris, Marc de Rosnay, and Fran-
cisco Pons have observed, “[P]arents elucidate 
a variety of mental states in conversation with 
their children. That elucidation is not tied to 
particular lexical terms or syntactic construc-
tions. Instead it reflects a wide- ranging sensi-
tivity to individual perspectives and nurtures 
the same sensitivity in children” (72).
On the other hand, finding that explicit 
use of metacognitive vocabulary in stories 
doesn’t seem to benefit children’s theory of 
mind led Peskin and Astington to take an-
other look at the implicit mentalizing ex-
pected of readers. In doing so, they were 
also prompted by an earlier study by Letitia 
Naigles, who found that “children exposed to 
more metacognitive terms of certainty (think, 
know, and guess) in a television show later 
displayed a poorer understanding of certainty 
distinctions than those exposed to episodes 
containing fewer of these terms,” as well as by 
the studies by Deepthi Kamawar (Peskin and 
Astington 265) and by Elizabeth Richner and 
Ageliki Nicolopoulou, who “compared chil-
dren whose teachers used more metacognitive 
vocabulary to those whose teachers used less” 
and “found superior performance on theory- 
of- mind tasks for children whose teachers 
used fewer metacognitive terms” (265).
As Peskin and Astington see it, “the 
teaching of information does not automati-
cally lead to learning.” What is required 
instead is a “constructive, effortful process 
where the learner actively reorganizes per-
ceptions and makes inferences. . . . These in-
ferences lead to an understanding that may 
be all the deeper because the children had to 
strive to infer meaning. Ironically, the more 
direct, explicit condition may have produced 
less conceptual development precisely be-
cause it was explicit” (266). In this view, read-
ing fiction emerges as a paradigmatic process 
of constructive learning:
Dramatic tension in stories is created when 
the various characters have disparate knowl-
edge with regard to the action. This may be 
through error: The reader knows that Romeo 
does not know that Juliet lies drugged, not 
dead. Or it may be through deception: Pre-
tending his assigned chore is an adventure, 




















Tom Sawyer tricks his friends into white-
washing the fence. (267)
This is where I believe literary scholars should 
enter this discussion. A conversation about 
implicit mentalizing expected from readers of 
fiction (particularly when the stakes are high, 
for Peskin and Astington imply that reading 
fiction may have long- term beneficial effects 
on students’ overall academic performance) is 
a conversation that we should be part of.
Theory of mind has been on the radar of 
critics for almost a decade, making inroads 
in narratology (Abbott; Palmer; Rabinow-
itz; Rabinowitz and Bancroft; Polvinen; Ver-
meule; Zunshine, Why We Read), historicism 
(Richardson; Spolsky), film and media theory 
(Plantinga; Smith), theater studies (Lyne), 
and queer theory (Vincent). We are still far 
off from any definitive understanding of what 
happens in the fiction- reading brain/ mind, 
but so are cognitive scientists. Moreover, a se-
ries of recent collaborations between literary 
scholars and cognitive scientists give us rea-
sons to think that our informed speculations 
(buttressed by our discipline’s long- standing 
interest in fictional consciousness) provide 
meaningful contributions to this project in 
progress (Phillips; Whalen, Zunshine, and 
Holquist; Vessel, Starr, and Rubin).
In what follows, I deal with one aspect of 
literary- critical exploration of theory of mind, 
which seems most relevant to the findings 
of Peskin, Astington, Naigles, and their col-
leagues. I take as my starting point the argu-
ment that fiction builds on the same cognitive 
adaptations for attributing thoughts and feel-
ings to other people and ourselves that we use 
in our daily social life. (Attributing, inciden-
tally, doesn’t mean attributing correctly. Given 
how often our interpretations of our own and 
other people’s behavior are wrong, a more ac-
curate name for our daily mind reading may be 
mind misreading.) The argument that reading 
fiction is mind reading was developed sepa-
rately in Alan Palmer’s Fictional Minds and 
my Why We Read Fiction. Palmer applies it 
primarily to novels, whereas I look at mental 
states in fiction, broadly defined as prose fic-
tion, drama, and narrative poetry, as well as 
memoirs concerned with imagination and con-
sciousness (e.g., Nabokov’s Speak, Memory).
One important feature of fictional mind 
reading is that it intensifies certain patterns 
of mind reading present in our daily social 
interactions. Think, for instance, of our expe-
rience of construing complex social situations 
in terms of triply nested mental states—that 
is, mental state within mental state within 
yet another mental state. After a conversa-
tion with my friend, I worry that she thought 
I meant the opposite of what I actually meant. 
My partner tells me that he didn’t want me 
to know what he was thinking. I hope that my 
son will remember tomorrow how he feels 
about this today. I am sure that you can recall 
some recent triple nestings of your own, al-
though we don’t explicitly articulate them to 
ourselves when we experience them.
Socially gripping and emotionally laden 
as triple nestings may be, in real life they are 
occasional. In fiction, they are omnipres-
ent. More precisely, they are omnipresent in 
the experience of reading, as opposed to be-
ing immanent in the text. Fiction prompts 
us to construct triple nestings to make sense 
of what we read, but the configuration and 
content of such nestings differ from one par-
ticular historically situated reader to another 
(Zunshine, “From the Social”). What remains 
stable is the nestedness itself: the basic unit 
of fictional meaning is a relationship among 
mental states.
Complex nestings start accumulating on 
the level of paragraphs (Zunshine, “Theory”), 
though individual sentences may exhibit 
them as well. They can also organize entire 
chapters. For a quick illustration of chapter- 
and act- level triple nesting of mental states, 
take another look at Peskin and Astington’s 
examples above: Tom didn’t want his friends 
to realize that he hated whitewashing the 


















fence; Romeo didn’t know that Juliet merely 
wanted some people to think that she is dead.
To refer to nested mental states at and 
above the third level, I introduced elsewhere 
the term “sociocognitive complexity,” ar-
guing that it can be created by a variety of 
means (“Theory”). For instance, the author 
may focus primarily on mental states of her 
characters or on mental states of characters, 
narrators, and implied readers. Moreover, she 
may choose to spell out those mental states 
or not to mention them at all and force us to 
infer them to make sense of what we read.
The same text may combine different 
means. For instance, E. M. Forster’s Howards 
End opens with, “One may as well begin with 
Helen’s letters to her sister” (3), but it also fea-
tures such sentences as, “Ought Margaret to 
know what Helen knew the Basts to know?” 
(254). The latter spells out nested mental 
states of characters; the former calls forth 
an implied author who wants his reader to 
know that the action will be filtered through 
the consciousness of a reflective narrator—an 
implied triple nesting of mental states.
Another example, Yevgeny Zamyatin’s 
We, here shows that a novel may position 
itself as not dealing with mental states (set 
in a dystopian future where feelings are jet-
tisoned for mathematical formulas) yet still 
completely depend on nested ones:
Все это без улыбки, я бы даже сказал, с не-
ко то рой почтительностью (может быть, 
ей из вестно, что я—строитель «Ин те-
грала»). Но не знаю—в глазах или бро вях—
какой-то стран ный раз дра жа ю щий икс, и 
я никак не могу его пой мать, дать ему ци-
фро вое вы ра же ние. (7)
All this without smiling, I’d even say with a 
certain reverence (perhaps she knows that I’m 
a builder of the Integral). But I’m not sure—in 
her eyes or eyebrows—there is some strange 
irritating x, and I can’t quite catch it, can’t as-
sign it a numerical expression. (trans. mine)
There is a whole constellation of triple nest-
ings here. For instance, D- 503 wonders if I- 
330 is impressed because she knows what he 
does. Also, he is irritated that he can’t fathom 
her exact attitude. Moreover, the implied 
reader understands that D- 503 doesn’t realize 
that he’s falling in love with I- 330.
One of my favorite examples of implied 
nested mental states comes from Cao Xue-
qin’s The Story of the Stone. There sociocogni-
tive complexity is created by strategic use of 
“this” before a character’s name (in the origi-




And now suddenly this Xue Bao- chai had 
appeared on the scene—a young lady who, 
though very little older than Dai- yu, pos-
sessed a grown- up beauty and aplomb in 
which all agreed Dai- yu was her inferior. 
 (Golden Days 124)
Here is one way to spell out the mental states 
that we infer as we make sense of this sen-
tence: the narrator wants his readers to real-
ize that Dai- yu feels more insecure than usual 
because she is certain that everyone around 
her considers her inferior to Bao- chai. That’s 
at least four nested mental states, but to ar-
ticulate them, we have to take in subtle cues, 
such as the unhappy tone with which Dai-
 yu refers to her cousin (“一個薛寶釵”: “a Xue 
Bao- chai”; “this Xue Bao- chai” in Hawkes’s 
translation) and our previous awareness of 
Dai- yu’s near- paranoid self- consciousness 
(Zunshine, “From the Social”).
I am casting my argument in point-
edly “cognitivist” terms (e.g., nested mental 
states, sociocognitive complexity), but this 
should not obscure the fact that people who 
first broached these issues were not cognitive 
scientists but literary scholars. It was Haun 
Saussy who observed, “That thoughts can be 
represented even if unspoken is a common-




















place of universal literature” (428). So too 
narrative theorists anticipated, in their explo-
ration of irony, the conversation about nested 
mental states, pointing out that in “any ex-
ample of narrative art there are, broadly 
speaking, three points of view—those of the 
characters, the narrators, and the audience. 
As narrative becomes more sophisticated, a 
fourth point of view is added by the develop-
ment of a clear distinction between the nar-
rator and the author” (Scholes, Phelan, and 
Kellog 240).
I take these insights further by mak-
ing two points. First, triply nested mental 
states—both implied and explicit—consti-
tute fundamental units of meaning in fiction. 
(Thus, each of the different points of view 
posited above by the narrative theorists is ex-
pressed as a nested mental state. For instance, 
in Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones, readers know 
that they have more insight into Mr. Thwa-
kum than does Mr. Allworthy. However, lest 
readers condemn “the wisdom and penetra-
tion of Mr Allworthy,” the narrator reminds 
them that the only reason they know what 
they do is that the narrator himself has “in-
formed” them “of these things” [117].) Sec-
ond, fictional nestings mimic patterns of our 
everyday social functioning, underwritten by 
theory of mind, yet go significantly beyond 
them. Fictional sociocognitive complexity is 
created by stylistic means unique to specific 
genres and authors and as such is not reduc-
ible to social cognition (which is complex in 
its own right [Zunshine, “Style”]).
Because something happens en route 
from Rosie’s Walk to Howards End. The mind 
reading expected from a preschooler to enjoy 
Hutchins’s story is quite sophisticated: the 
child delights in her knowledge that Rosie the 
hen doesn’t know that the hungry fox wants 
to devour her and that she has one lucky es-
cape after another. The reader of Howards 
End builds on this early sophistication but 
also on the massive cultural- cognitive scaf-
folding that has accrued in the intervening 
years. She brings to Forster’s novel the mas-
tery of the codes of fiction,4 including genre 
and heteroglot awareness, that comes with 
more reading of fictional minds. For in-
stance, a nine- year- old may in principle get 
the meaning of “Ought Margaret to know 
what Helen knew the Basts to know,” but she 
won’t hear its parodic tone. Hence she won’t 
question the likelihood of Forster’s narrator 
spouting such a crude nesting and double- 
check its source in the text,5 which turns out 
to be Tibby, a young man bored by “personal 
relations.” (And, of course, a student who 
pays attention to sources of statements is very 
different from a student who doesn’t, as any 
science or history teacher can attest.)
How are these speculations relevant to 
the CCSSI insistence that informational texts 
promote the acquisition of vocabulary in stu-
dents and thus should outweigh literary texts 
in ELA? The answer to this question depends 
on how seriously you take the studies of devel-
opmental psychologists that suggest, first, that 
it is the metacognitive vocabulary (i.e., think-
ing about thinking) that promotes academic 
success and, second, that simply encountering 
this vocabulary in texts and classroom discus-
sions does not contribute to its acquisition.
If you take such studies seriously, socio-
cognitive complexity of literary texts deserves 
another look. Literary texts always function 
on a higher level of sociocognitive complex-
ity than do informational texts; moreover, 
they can achieve this higher level without the 
explicit use of metacognitive terms. By imply-
ing nested mental states, fiction exemplifies 
the “constructive, effortful process where the 
learner actively reorganizes perceptions and 
makes inferences” (Peskin and Astington 266).
Of course, informational texts can occa-
sionally be highly sociocognitively complex, 
and instructors who teach them may occa-
sionally make a point of not piling up meta-
cognitive vocabulary and thus doing the hard 
work for their students (Zunshine, “Why Fic-
tion”). But if one looks for consistently high 


















sociocognitive complexity simultaneous with 
consistently active reorganization of percep-
tions and inferences, only fiction delivers. 
Teaching less of it amounts to a regressive tax 
on education because only students whose 
parents encourage them to read a lot of fiction 
on their own will still do well. The less fortu-
nate others will end with poorer vocabularies 
and grades.
NOTES
1. Research in theory of mind has been growing ex-
ponentially in all branches of psychology, from cognitive 
neuroscience to social psychology, as well as in cognitive 
literary studies, but for the purposes of this piece I focus 
on developmental psychology and pedagogy and then on 
cognitive literary theory.
2. I am grateful to Ernest Morrell and to students in 
Sheridan Blau’s colloquium of the En glish Education 
Program at Teachers College, Columbia University, for 
this insight.
3. See also de Rosnay, Pons, Harris, and Morrell; 
Hughes, White, and Ensor.
4. Here and elsewhere I am grateful to Evelyne Ender 
and Deidre Shauna Lynch for their insightful suggestions.
5. On source monitoring in fiction, see Zunshine, 
Why We Read.
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